This paper examines the effect of temporarily suspending the trading of exchange-listed individual stocks. We evaluate whether regulatory authorities can successfully use the mechanism of trading suspension in forcing companies to disclose new and material information to the capital market. Previous studies on trading suspensions mainly concentrate on North-American stock markets and find no conclusive results. This study utilizes a new data set comprising of firms listed on Euronext Brussels. Our results show that suspension is indeed an effective means of disseminating new information. Stock prices adjust completely and instantaneously to the new information released during trading suspensions. We observe a significant increase in trading volume after the reinstatement of trading. On the other hand, we do not find any increase in stock return volatility around trading suspensions. Overall, our results show the efficacy of trading suspensions in disseminating new information. 
Introduction
Do investors care about the quality of the financial markets in which they operate? Although an affirmative answer seems obvious and natural, only recently the law and finance literature initiated by the seminal papers of Vishny (1997, 1998 ) started investigating the relationship between a country's legal framework and its financial development. These studies offer strong empirical evidence on the importance of the legal environment (market integrity, investor protection) of a country for the development of its financial markets and economic growth. A good legal environment is shown to expand the ability of companies to raise external finance through either debt or equity.
In its recent proposal of the Market Abuse Directive, the European Commission also stresses the importance of an adequate legal framework for companies to raise capital. 1 The
Federation of European Stock Exchanges (FESE) subscribes to that statement as well (FESE, 2000 (FESE, , 2001 . As the European Commission defines market abuse as a situation in which investors "have used information which is not publicly available to their own advantage", the supervision of ongoing disclosure obligations, particularly the ad-hoc disclosure of pricesensitive news, is of crucial importance in order to promote market integrity and market quality.
A widely used mechanism to regulate disclosure of new information to the capital market is trading suspension. We define trading suspension as a temporary interruption in official trading of an individual stock listed on a stock exchange. 2 Authorities usually adopt this regulatory measure to disseminate price-sensitive information during the trading hours of a stock exchange with the intention of providing investors extra time to evaluate newly released information about a specific company. The regulation is especially used when it is believed that there have been an inability or an intentional behavior of a listed firm not to 2 The term 'trading suspension' can also refer to other kinds of regulatory measures. A 'circuit breaker' involves a market-wide halt of trading of all stocks. Restrictions are imposed on the movement of market-wide prices (or volumes) beyond pre-set parameters in order to reduce market volatility (e.g. rule 80B of the NYSE). Besides market-wide circuit breakers, restrictions on daily price variations of individual securities also exist (e.g. rule 4404/1 Euronext Rule Book). In case of a 'listing suspension', the supervisory authority decides to suspend the stock exchange listing of a particular security until the situation of non-compliance with the continuing obligations arising from a listing has been remedied. Finally, 'delisting' refers to the permanent cancellation of the listing.
make an information disclosure. Trading suspension is thus considered to be a crucial regulatory measure in order to maintain a fair and orderly market in which "all investors should have simultaneous access on a timely basis to the information they require to take their investment decisions" (FESCO, 2001 ).
The desirability of trading suspension is subject to considerable debate among regulators, market participants and academics. Proponents of trading suspension argue that it provides investors extra time to evaluate newly released information so that no specific group of investors obtain an unduly advantage in stock trading. They also argue that stock prices become more informative, uncertainty is reduced and investors are protected from volatile price movements. On the other hand, critics argue that trading suspension simply delays stock price adjustments, imposes additional costs to investors who are deprived of trading opportunities and makes a stock exchange less attractive to investors. Ultimately, the regulatory authority needs "to weigh the benefits of allowing continuous trading against the desirability of interposing processes which afford market users the opportunity to reassess a changed situation and to alter their orders accordingly".
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How effective are these trading suspensions? Do suspensions allow the stock market to receive new information? Do stock prices adjust quickly to the information released during the suspension period? Does the stock volatility change due to suspension? By addressing these issues, this study assesses the overall efficiency of trading suspensions to disseminate new information among market participants. Therefore, we examine the pattern of trading activity before and after the trading suspension in order to evaluate this regulatory policy measure. Moreover, based on detailed information provided by the stock exchange, the empirical analysis traces if the return behavior surrounding the trading suspension is affected by the publicly announced reason for the suspension.
The study complements the current literature in several ways. First, our sample of trading suspensions offers an opportunity to examine this regulatory measure on a stock market that is well suited to testing pure information effects. Many earlier studies have investigated samples from the North-American stock markets where the majority of suspensions were due to imbalance between buy and sell orders or delayed openings (Hopewell and Schwartz, 1978; Kryzanowski and Nemiroff, 2001 and proximity and supports the allocation of regulatory powers 'closer to the market'. The alleged benefits of allocating the supervision to the exchange itself are: (a) familiarity with the trading system and its screening and filtering algorithms, (b) closer contact with market 4 Although often used synonymously, it is useful to make a distinction between trading halt and trading suspension. The former is generally used for short durations (up to one trading session), whereas the latter is generally used for more than one trading session. Trading halts in a strict sense do not necessarily lead to a disclosure of new information; these are in most cases intended to correct order imbalances or delayed openings. Trading suspensions imposed by Euronext Brussels are due to lack of new information disclosure. 5 In 2000, three stock exchanges, the Brussels Stock Exchange, the Amsterdam Exchanges and the Paris Bourse, merged together to form a single securities market called Euronext.
participants and (c) more timely actions when market irregularities are detected, all of which are crucial elements to install a trading suspension for disseminating price-sensitive news.
This study adds to the debate whether a regulation 'close to the market', such as the regulation on the dissemination of price-sensitive information during the trading hours of Euronext Brussels, can maintain an orderly market.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In section two, we review the existing literature. In the following section, we explain the phenomenon of trading suspension with the help of an example. Section four explains the research methodology and section five describes the sample. Empirical results are reported in section six. The final section summarizes and presents conclusions.
Review of the Literature
Hopewell and Schwartz (1978) examine trading suspensions (halts) on the NYSE. About 92% of these suspensions did not exceed the length of one trading day. In addition, almost half of these suspensions are not related to disclosure of new information, but to order imbalances. The authors find that events triggering news suspensions typically result in suspensions of longer duration and stock price changes of greater magnitude than for imbalance suspensions. They also observe that stock prices adjust rapidly to the new information released during the suspension period.
On the other hand, investigating trading suspensions on Canadian stock exchanges, Kryzanowski (1979) finds that only the good news disseminated during a trading suspension is rapidly impounded in stock prices. When suspension leads to the disclosure of bad news, the stock market fails in full and rapid impounding of that information in stock prices. One particular feature of this sample is very long duration of suspensions: the average length of the trading suspension period for the good and bad news sample are 15 and 10 weeks, respectively.
Suspensions ordered by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in the U.S. are also of relatively longer duration. Howe and Schlarbaum (1986) analyze a sample of these suspensions with an average length of 12 weeks. They find a substantial disclosure of bad news during the suspended period. Moreover, they observe that stock price continue to decline even after the reinstatement of trading. The results of Kryzanowski (1979) A few studies also investigate suspensions on non-American stock exchanges. Kabir (1994) observes that more than 70% of trading suspensions on the London Stock Exchange remain in force for more than one month. A majority of the suspended companies are afterwards 
Trading suspension: an illustration
In Belgium, the suspension of trading is the mandate of the Market Authority on Euronext Brussels. The rules of suspension are formulated in broad and vague terms. The Exchange 6 can suspend trading in one or more securities for the duration that it finds necessary to protect the public interest. The mission of the Exchange is to ensure equality among shareholders and correct information to the public, in particular with regard to the dissemination of price sensitive information. The generally followed policy is that any public disclosure of price sensitive information should be made after the closure of the market on the day on which the fact occurred or on which the decision was taken. This policy is justified on two grounds.
Firstly, a disclosure during the opening hours would distort the stock's price formation.
Secondly, a disclosure after the closing of the market allows information dissemination in the broadest sense (through the press). These grounds are obviously at odds with the goal of an informationally efficient stock market. Moreover, foreign dual listings can complicate such disclosure policy.
The guideline usually followed for trading suspensions can be described as follows. The York. Barco issued a press release in Brussels confirming the acquisition.
The stock price behavior surrounding the suspension is shown in figure 1 . We can see that the share price of Barco increased substantially after the opening of the Exchange. The opening share price was EUR 235. By the time the suspension decision was taken, the share price increased by 1.5 percent to EUR 238.5. This sudden share price increase together with the news from the U.S. have probably led the market authority on Euronext Brussels to decide to temporarily suspension the trading of Barco shares. The suspension of such a short duration led to the release of additional new information which was interpreted positively by investors.
Stock prices of Barco jumped by another 1.7 percent from EUR 238.5 just before the start of suspension to EUR 242.7 at the reinstatement of trading. This change in stock price reflects the content of new information released during the suspension period.
<insert figure 1 here>
The volume of trade indicates a similar interpretation of the news disclosed during the trading suspension. There was a relatively higher trading volume on the day after suspension compared to the day before suspension. Investors appeared to have reacted to the information released through suspension by initiating new buy or sell orders. An increased trading volume was not observed anymore during the days afterwards.
Research methodology

Stock return analysis
We analyze the stock return behavior surrounding trading suspensions by using the event study methodology. We test if the average abnormal return (AAR E ) on the day of the event (suspension) is equal to zero (the null hypothesis). The alternative hypothesis is a non-zero abnormal stock return. The tests are expressed as follows:
If trading suspensions are effective, we expect to find no abnormal returns prior to or after the suspension. In other words, suspensions are expected to be installed unexpectedly and to be withdrawn when a full disclosure of information takes place. The average abnormal return on the event day is derived from aggregating individual stock abnormal returns aligned in event time, and is expressed as:
where N is the number of stocks in the sample.
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Individual stock abnormal returns are measured as the difference between the realized or actual return on the event day R i, t and the expected return E[R i, t ], which is the benchmark normal return in the absence of the event:
We analyze a 41-day event window that encompasses the event day and twenty trading days before and after suspension. We define the event day (day 0) as the day on which trading suspension occurs, day [-1] as the trading day immediately before the day of suspension, and day [+1] as the day immediately after the end of suspension. Daily stock returns are calculated using close-to-close stock prices. The return of day [0] is calculated using the last closing price before suspension and the first closing price after suspension. Similarly, the return of day [+1] is calculated as the return from the first closing price of the stock after trading suspension to the next closing price. Although many trading suspensions are single day suspensions, some are multiple day suspensions. In order to obtain a comparable daily return on the event day, the multiple day total return over the suspension period is scaled by the number of suspended trading days.
A key issue in an event study is how to measure "abnormal" returns. Since no single model has emerged as the most appropriate one, we use three different models to estimate the expected return of stocks and also to check the robustness of the results. These different models are described as follows: 6 The following notations are used in the rest of the paper: R i, t = the continuously compounded return of stock i in period t; R m, t = the continuously compounded market index return in period t; AR i, t = abnormal return of stock i on day t of the estimation period; AR i, E = abnormal return of stock i on the event day; R m, t = market index return on day t of the estimation period; R m, E = market index return on the event day; m R = average market index return during the estimation period; T = number of trading days in the estimation period; i ŝ = estimated standard deviation of the abnormal return of stock i during the estimation period; SAR i, E = standardised abnormal return of stock i on the event day. 
where, with ϕ i,t = 1 when AR i,E > 0, and 0 otherwise.
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The main disadvantage of parametric tests is that these are based on assumptions about the probability distribution of returns. Non-parametric tests do not depend on the assumption of normality. Because non-parametric tests do not use the return variance, these tests are more appropriate in case of event-induced variance. For, if the variance is underestimated, traditional test statistics will reject the null hypothesis too frequently, even when the average abnormal return is in fact zero, and should be avoided accordingly. Besides event-induced variance, the problem of thin trading is also crucial for a test specification. Cowan (1992) shows that the generalized sign test performs well for thinly traded stocks.
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Trading volume analysis
We also analyze the trading volume behavior surrounding trading suspensions. Abnormal change in trading volume is an alternate way of investigating the value of information disclosed through an event. The trading volume analysis, performed following the methodology of Michaely, Thaler and Seguin (1994) , is briefly described below.
The turnover of stock i on day t is defined as the number of traded shares divided by the number of outstanding shares:
7 The difference between the generalized sign test and the traditional sign test is the value of p under the null hypothesis. While the traditional sign test uses a value of 0.50, the generalized sign test uses the fraction of positive returns in the estimation period, measured across N stocks and T days as value for p. 8 Cowan and Sergeant (1996) point out that thinly traded stocks are characterized by numerous zero and large non-zero returns, causing non-normal return distributions. This causes traditional test statistics to be poorly specified (Campbell and Wasley, 1993) .
where VOLUME it is the number of traded shares of stock i on day t, and SHARES i is the number of outstanding shares of stock i. The average turnover of suspended stocks on each trading day is calculated as:
where N is the number of trading suspensions in the sample.
The expected trading volume for each stock is calculated over the estimation period [from day -100 to day -21] as:
The abnormal (relative to the estimation period) stock turnover is calculated for each day of the event window [from day -20 to day +20] as:
where 'E' denotes the event window.
Volatility analysis
The effect of trading suspension on the stock return volatility is also examined in this study.
Many argue that a full disclosure of information by means of trading suspension should lead to a reduction of stock return volatility. 
Data
Our empirical analysis is based on data obtained directly from Euronext Brussels. We start by collecting information on all common stock trading suspensions of listed Belgian companies.
We also gather information on the start and the end of the suspension period, stock prices immediately before and after trading suspension, and the reason for suspension. These data are collected either from the stock exchange or from the daily Belgian financial newspaper
De Financieel Economische Tijd. Daily share price data are collected from Datastream. (12) are not included in the sample because these were delisted from the Exchange as trading did not resume after the suspension. Trading of these firms was suspended mainly as a result of bankruptcy, corporate reorganization or non-compliance of Exchange's disclosure regulation.
Suspensions involving a few holding companies are also excluded because along with the suspension of one company's stock, the trading of all related company stocks is suspended as well. Finally, some suspensions are excluded from the sample because the period used for the estimation of model parameters to calculate expected returns overlap with the event period.
These two last reasons lead to the exclusion of seven companies from the sample.
Thus, the final sample of our analysis consists of 102 trading suspensions involving 72 different companies. We use daily stock returns for our analysis. Due to unavailability of daily trading volume data, we could use a sample of 61 trading suspensions for the trading volume analysis.
A frequency distribution of trading suspensions in our sample is presented in Table 2 . We observe that the sample is well distributed over the different years of the sample period. Only 30% suspensions are intra-day suspensions, which means that the reinstatement of trading takes place on the same day. The half of trading suspensions in the sample is single day suspensions. Trading of these companies is resumed on the following day. The rest of trading suspensions (20%) in our sample are for periods of two days or more.
<insert table 2 here>
Empirical results
In this section, we present the results of the empirical analysis. Because the sample includes trading suspensions due to different news categories, any aggregation across all stocks would make the results difficult to interpret. The price impacts of different news categories will tend to offset each other leading to negligible abnormal stock price movements. Therefore, we divide the total sample in three sub-samples according to the most important reasons for trading suspensions, i.e. mergers and acquisitions (54 suspensions), divestitures (14 suspensions) and other restructurings (21 suspensions). King, Pownall and Waymire (1991) also find that 80% of their sample trading suspensions is related to disclosures about corporate takeovers and leverage buyouts. Although a finer partitioning of the sample would lead to better results, it is not possible to do so because of the relatively small sample size.
If a trading suspension leads to a significant disclosure of new information, stock prices should change accordingly. One can also observe significant changes in trading volume in response to announcements of material information. These two tests are performed first and described in sections 6.1 and 6.2. Section 6.3 presents additional results on the suspensionrelated change in stock return volatility.
Analysis of stock returns
We analyze abnormal stock returns by estimating equation [3] . In this estimation, we use three different models as shown in equations [4] -[6] to measure expected stock returns. The results of market adjusted excess returns are first presented in Table 3 . We find that trading suspensions lead, on average, to a statistically significant impact on stock returns. In the mergers and acquisitions sample, the mean abnormal return on the day of suspension is 8 percent. The t-test and the sign-tests show that this abnormal return is statistically significant at the 1% level. The excess stock returns during the days preceding trading suspension are very small in magnitude and statistically also insignificant. The findings do not indicate any information leakage prior to suspension. Most of the daily stock returns after trading suspensions are also very small in magnitude and insignificant. The small cumulative abnormal stock return during the post suspension period suggests that stock prices adjust quickly and completely to the new information released during the suspension.
The abnormal stock returns for the two other samples are also presented in Table 3 . For the divestitures sample, we observe that the abnormal stock return is -0.4% on the day of suspension. Although the t-test indicates that the average return is statistically significant, the two non-parametric tests fail to show any significance. Note here that the sample size is relatively small. Similarly, for the restructuring sample, we find that the average excess stock return on the day of trading suspension is -3.8%. But, both the parametric and the nonparametric tests do not show statistical significance. In line with the mergers and acquisitions sample results, these findings indicate that trading suspensions take place unexpectedly.
suspension period stock return shows no sign of inefficient stock price adjustment.
<insert table 3 here>
Another way to clearly observe the results is to present the abnormal returns over time in a figure. This is done in Figure 2 which depicts the market adjusted cumulative average abnormal daily stock returns around trading suspensions. The simple solid line is for mergers and acquisitions sample, the bold solid line is for restructuring sample and the dotted line is for divestitures sample. The figure clearly shows lack of information leakage prior to trading suspension, material information disclosure during suspension, and stock price full adjustment to the newly released information. These findings are consistent with the predictions of a semi-strong form of informationally efficient stock market. These are also consistent with those of Hopewell and Schwartz (1978) . However, these results are in contrast to those obtained by Kryzanowski (1979) and Howe and Schlarbaum (1986) . They find continuous downward adjustment of stock prices even after the resumption of trading.
This specific finding is mainly related to unfavorable information suspensions of long duration (several weeks).
<insert figure 2 here>
We check the robustness of these results by estimating abnormal stock returns using two other benchmarks. Since the results are qualitatively very similar, we present the excess returns in a condensed form in Table 4 . We find that the average abnormal stock returns in the pre-suspension period are negligible and statistically insignificant. For the mergers and acquisitions sample, the excess return over the suspended period is positive and significant.
The finding is insensitive to the model used to estimate excess returns. The stock return results during the post-suspension period are also robust. The behavior of excess stock returns for the mergers and acquisitions sample suggests that new and material information is conveyed to the market through trading suspension. The market also rapidly impounds the information released during suspension. The results from the divestitures and restructurings samples are also robust to the choice of model used in estimating excess stock returns. Here we find that stock price changes are, on average, insignificant. No material information disclosure takes place during suspensions.
<insert table 4 here>
Analysis of trading volume
The average abnormal trading volume surrounding trading suspensions [from day -20 to day +20] is estimated using equation [15] . These are reported in Table 5 and graphically shown in Figure 3 . The results indicate that no abnormal trading volume pattern is present before trading suspensions. On the first trading day after the suspension, the average turnover is six times as high as normal. This increase is statistically significant at the 1% level. On day [+2]
and [+3] the abnormal trading turnover is 3.70 and 3.27 (the estimated t-values are 8.51 and 7.15, respectively). Table 5 shows that significant abnormal volumes are found during the first five trading days after suspensions. It reflects the economic significance of the information released during suspension. It also confirms our earlier findings from the stock return analysis indicating that suspensions are associated with the release of new and material information. Figure 3 clearly shows that the trading volume has a decreasing trend from day [+1] onwards. Trading volume returns to its normal level only gradually. Overall, our results are consistent with the results of prior empirical studies such as Ferris, Kumar and Wolfe (1992), Lee, Ready and Seguin (1994) and Kryzanowski and Nemiroff (1998) .
<insert table 5 here> <insert figure 3 here>
Analysis of stock return volatility
Besides analyzing abnormal return and trading volume behavior around trading suspensions, we also examine stock return volatility around suspensions. We investigate if a sudden information flux from trading suspension causes abnormal stock price volatility. This is a parameter that can be of interest to regulatory bodies in order to decide whether to impose a trading suspension or not.
In Table 6 we present results of tests whether the median variance around trading suspension is different compared to the median historical variance. The variance is estimated using daily raw stock returns as well as abnormal stock returns. We find that the median variance of the event period [-20, +20] is about twice that of the historical variance. With the Z-scores for the Wilcoxon signed rank test of -4.30 and -4.42, the difference in variance is statistically significant at the 1% level. This means that the increase in stock price volatility in the event period is due to the release of information during the trading suspensions.
Although the event period variance is observed to be higher than the historical variance, further investigation shows that this increase in variance is solely due to the large price change that takes place over the trading suspension itself. This can be seen when the event window is broken down into pre-suspension and post-suspension periods. We find that the <insert table 6 here> Therefore, we conclude that there is no increase in stock return volatility prior to or after trading suspension. It implies that the decisions taken by the Exchange to suspend trading and to reinstate trading did not cause a significant change in stock return volatility. The
Exchange's policy appears to be successful towards the dissemination of price sensitive information without causing an abrupt change in volatility. The evidence contradicts the results reported by Ferris, Kumar and Wolfe (1992) for the U.S. market. They report an increase of volatility around trading suspensions.
Conclusions
This paper empirically examines trading suspensions on Euronext Brussels. The study is of particular interest because of three reasons. First, these suspensions occur in order to compel firms to disclose new information to the market. This is different from suspensions of trading due to delayed openings and at times of imbalances in buy or sell orders and extreme volatility. Second, prior studies show conflicting results with regard to the effectiveness of trading suspensions. Both efficient and inefficient stock price adjustments are documented.
Thirdly, this empirical study adds to the debate whether an exchange can add value by ensuring market integrity, compared to a single central, administrative regulatory authority which is promoted by the European Commission. With respect to the dissemination of pricesensitive information and the installment of trading suspensions, the empirical study evaluates whether an allocation of regulatory powers 'close to the market' operates efficiently.
In this study, we focus on three different parameters: stock return, trading volume and return volatility to determine in a robust way the efficacy of trading suspensions. We subdivide the entire sample into three major categories based on the nature of information disclosed: This figure presents daily market adjusted cumulative average abnormal returns (CAR) for the event window [-20, +20] surrounding trading suspensions for three sub-samples: mergers and acquisitions (M&A), divestitures (Divest) and restructurings (Restr). The figure plots average abnormal trading volume (AV) for the event window [-20, +20] surrounding trading suspensions. The sample comprises 61 trading suspensions. Volume is expressed as the number of shares traded of a stock relative to the total number of outstanding shares of the same stock. Abnormal volume during the days of the event period is calculated relative to the estimation period [-100, -21] . 
Event window
Abnormal volume 
AV
